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Abstract
The experience of the 2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis has showed that the
bank capital regulation in place was inadequate to deal with "man-
ufacturing" tail risk in the ﬁnancial sector. This paper proposes an
incentive-based design of bank capital regulation aimed at eﬃciently
dealing with tail risk engendered by bank top managers. It has two
speciﬁc features: (i) ﬁrst, it incorporates information on the optimal in-
centive contract between bank shareholders and bank managers, thereby
dealing with the internal agency problem; (ii) second, it relies on the
mechanism of mandatory recapitalization to ensure this contract is
adopted by bank shareholders.
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1 Introduction
One of the important roles of bank capital regulation is to restrain banks from excessive
risk-taking in the context of the explicit and implicit government guarantees they may
enjoy. However, the experience of the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis shows clearly that capital
regulation in place at the time failed to perform this role. This failure may be partially
related to the fact that the capital regulation framework did not adjust in time to the
substantial changes in bank business culture brought about by new techniques in ﬁnancial
engineering, growing securitization and the development of complex ﬁnancial products.
One of the direct results of these changes was the emergence of tail risk characterized by
rare but devastating losses. There is now extensive empirical evidence that, by focusing
on short-term performance, top management in banks was engaged in "manufacturing"
tail risk (Acharya et al.(2010)) in order to generate immediate proﬁts, without regard
to the long-term consequences. It seems that risk management strategies in the period
preceding the crisis were beyond the control of bank shareholders. In such a context, to
deal eﬀectively with such "manufactured" tail risk in the banking sector, bank capital
regulation should have taken into consideration the internal agency problem, instead of
focusing exclusively on the interests of bank shareholders.
This study proposes an incentive-based design of capital requirements which will in-
duce shareholders to shape executive compensation in such a way as to prevent managers
from engendering tail risk. To illustrate these proposals, we build a simple continuous-
time model in the principal-agent framework, where a senior bank manager has a re-
versible choice between prudent and imprudent risk management strategies. An impru-
dent risk management strategy exposes the bank to tail risk characterized by infrequent
but devastating losses, while a prudent risk management strategy implies no tail risk but
generates a lower expected asset return. We assume that imprudent risk management
allows the manager to collect private beneﬁts. Such a set-up corresponds to the double
moral hazard problem, since it is not only the manager who may be interested in engaging
in tail risk, but bank shareholders as well. To be able to prevent imprudent risk manage-
ment in this context, incentive-based capital requirements should incorporate information
about the optimal incentive contract between bank shareholders and bank manager. This
feature diﬀerentiates our capital regulation design from existing approaches, which deal
with a bank as if it was a black box.
The existing capital regulation literature (see, for instance, Brattachariya (2002), Dé-
camps et al. (2004), Rochet (2004)) shows that portfolio risk can be prevented through
the mandatory incentive-based liquidation rule. However, the liquidation rule appears to
be ill-suited to tail risk : even in the absence of internal agency problems, it fails to pre-
vent the bank from engaging in tail risk when bank asset value approaches the liquidation
point. In fact since, in the neighborhood of the liquidation threshold, the bank default is
more likely to be triggered by random ﬂuctuations of asset return rather than by infre-
quent large losses, the bank will engage in tail risk in order to increase the asset growth
rate and to move away from the liquidation point.1 To speciﬁcally deal with tail risk, we
design capital requirements in the form of the incentive recapitalization rule. Under the
enforceable recapitalization rule, portfolio risk cannot cause bank failure. At the same
1The auxiliary result we get, while demonstrating this feature, is the design of equity value in a
setting, where the underlying asset's value evolves according to jump-diﬀusion process.
time, engaging in tail risk will increase the likelihood of further mandatory recapitaliza-
tions and thus impose higher expected recapitalization costs on bank shareholders. In
fact, it is the fear of bearing the additional recapitalization costs due to tail risk exposure
that will induce bank shareholders to promote prudent risk management in their bank.
Although costly recapitalizations are studied in the liquidity management literature
(Décamps et al. (2011), Rochet and Villeneuve (2011)) and the capital regulation litera-
ture (Peura and Keppo (2003), Milne and Walley (2002)), no one has previously explored
the potential incentive eﬀect of mandatory recapitalizations, to the best of our knowl-
edge. However, we are not the ﬁrst to point out the need to consider the internal agency
problem within a capital regulation design. Bris and Cantale (2004) address this issue in
the context of portfolio risk management, examining the impact of capital requirements
on the eﬀort choice of a self-interested risk-averse bank manager in a discrete time frame-
work. They come to the conclusion that capital regulation, which does not take into
account the internal agency problem, leads to a socially-unoptimal choice of the lower
level of risk. Here, in the context of tail risk and with risk-neutral agents, our model
shows, in contrast, that the bank will operate at the higher level of risk. Moreover, we
explicitly show how to adapt the optimal design of capital regulation to take account of
the internal agency problem, linking the literature on incentive capital regulation and the
fast-growing literature on optimal contracts in a dynamic framework (Sannikov(2008),
Biais et al. (2010), DeMarzo, Lidvan and Tchistyi (2011)).
The nature of the moral hazard problem studied in this paper situates it close to Biais
et al. (2010). In their model, the agent's eﬀort aﬀects a ﬁrm's exposure to a disaster
risk, given that lower eﬀort enables the manager to collect private beneﬁts proportional
to the ﬁrm's size. However, they consider Poisson risk to be the sole type of risk the
ﬁrm faces, whereas in our setting the bank asset value is also aﬀected by Brownian
risk. Both Poisson and Brownian risks are present in the model of DeMarzo, Lidvan
and Tchistyi (2011), who design an optimal contract in a two-dimensional setting with
Arithmetic Brownian Motion (ABM), when the manager can privately choose between
two risk regimes aﬀecting a ﬁrm's proﬁt and also has the option of diverting part of the
generated cash ﬂow. In our model constructed in a setting with Geometric Brownian
Motion (GBM), the manager controls an asset growth, rather than a bank's proﬁtability.
Moreover, we restrict our analysis to the class of linear contracts so as to be able to
integrate information on the structure of the optimal contract into the capital regulation
design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 explains the incentive eﬀect of mandatory recapitalizations. In Section 4 we design
an optimal mandatory recapitalization policy in a setting free of the internal agency
problem. Section 5 presents an optimal mandatory recapitalization policy in the context
of the internal agency problem. In Section 6 we discuss related regulatory policy issues.
Section 7 concludes. All proofs are provided in Appendix B.
2 The model
We consider a risk-neutral bank protected by limited liability. The bank is ﬁnanced
by a constant volume of insured deposits, D, and incurs a continuous payment rD to
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depositors,2 where r denotes a riskless interest rate. Bank assets continuously generate a
cash-ﬂow δxt, where xt denotes a publicly observable asset value. Thus, an instantaneous
cash-ﬂow received by shareholders after paying debt service is given by δxt − rD.3
The bank is run by a manager. The contract with the manager can be described by
a triplet {xT , R(x), RT}, where xT denotes a contract termination rule,4 R(x) ≥ 05 for
x > xT is an asset-based remuneration and RT ≥ 0 is a terminal pay-oﬀ delivered at
the contract termination date. The manager is protected by limited liability and has no
initial wealth which could be pledged.
The manager has a reversible discretionary choice between 2 risk management strate-
gies: prudent and imprudent. Imprudent risk management allows for expected asset
return rate µ and involves a bank in tail risk, which implies infrequent but large losses
of bank assets. Large losses caused by tail risk materializing follow a Poisson process
{Nt}t≥0 with intensity λ. A large loss destroys a fraction (1−α)xt of bank assets, where
α ∈ (0, 1) is a constant coeﬃcient reﬂecting the proportion of assets remaining after the
large loss is realized. Prudent risk management strategy is free of tail-risk exposure but
has a lower expected asset return rate, (µ−∆µ), where 0 < ∆µ < λ(1− α). From now
on we will assume that r > δ + (µ−∆µ).
Let ut ∈ {0, 1} be a control variable reﬂecting risk-management strategy, where ut = 1
corresponds to prudent and ut = 0 corresponds to imprudent risk management. Bank
asset value follows:6
dxt = (µ− ut∆µ)xtdt+ σxtdZt − (1− ut)(1− α)xtdNt, (1)
where σ is the asset return volatility and {Zt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian process.
We assume that imprudent risk management allows the manager to collect private
beneﬁts bxtdt. Private beneﬁts may represent proceeds from private trading on the ﬁnan-
cial markets, given that tail-risk management strategies may boost equity growth in the
short term.7 However, materialization of tail risk, will make the choice of management
technology veriﬁable ex-post, so that the contract with the manager can stipulate that
he will be ﬁred without any terminal pay if a large loss occurs. The threat of being ﬁred
after the loss represents a maximum feasible punishment under the limited liability of the
manager, allowing shareholders to minimize the cost of creating incentives.
2We do not explicitly model deposit insurance premium, since recapitalization mechanism will elim-
inate default risk. Otherwise, deposit insurance premium could be deducted from the expected asset
return rate.
3Note that δx − rD < 0 corresponds to liquidity injections from the "deep pockets" of bank share-
holders as long as they interested in keeping the bank alive.
4Since we are dealing with a stationary problem, a termination rule xT will determine the expected
contract duration.
5We could consider a non-zero reservation wage for the manager in order to care about the existing
competition for top managers in banking sector. However, the focus of this paper is on prudent risk
management and not on value creation, which strongly depends on speciﬁc managerial talent.
6Expression (1) captures a trade-oﬀ between faster asset growth and asset safety, formalizing a so-
called "search for yield" strategy of banks in the period prior to the crisis. Indeed, practices like aggressive
subprime lending, abusive use of securitization, poor trading discipline, creative accounting might allow
the bank to create the illusion of high performance in the short-run but will inevitably lead to large
losses in the long run.
7Bebchuk at al. (2010) estimate that the top managers of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were
able to realize about $2 bln, by unloading shares and options during 2000-2008.
3
Since large losses incurred by a single bank may inﬂict negative externalities on the
rest of the banking sector (especially when they lead to the bank's failure), we assume that
the objective of the bank regulator is to induce prudent risk-management by using capital
regulation tools. Capital regulation in our model is designed in the form of a mandatory
recapitalization policy involving two regulatory parameters: mandatory recapitalization
rule xR and recapitalization coeﬃcient s > 1, such that sxR is the target bank asset value
after the mandatory recapitalization. Thus, bank shareholders should inject fresh equity
capital (s − 1)xR each time the bank asset value hits the mandatory recapitalization
threshold xR. However, if the bank asset value suddenly falls below the recapitalization
threshold, the bank should be liquidated by the regulator (i.e., incumbent shareholders
will be expropriated of equity), since a sudden violation of capital requirements shows
imprudent risk management.8
As in Décamps et al. (2011), we allow for two types of recapitalization costs: propor-
tional costs ξ1, which are imposed on each unit of capital raised, and lump-sum costs ξ0.
Recapitalization costs can reﬂect taxes, expert and registration costs of the new equity
issue, as well as asset restructuring costs.9 We denote K(xt) the total costs shareholders
incur when issuing new equity at time t
K(xt) = (ξ1 + 1)(s− 1)xt + ξ0 (2)
As we will show in the next section, recapitalization costs represent a driving force of
the proposed incentive mechanism.
3 The incentive eﬀect of recapitalizations
To illustrate the need for capital regulation in the above set-up and its value when
implemented in the form of mandatory recapitalization policy, let us consider the optimal
strategy of bank shareholders when there is no capital regulation.
To focus on the incentive eﬀect of recapitalizations, we will abstract from the internal
agency problem, analyzing risk management decisions in the owner-managed bank. Bank
shareholders maximize equity value, by instantaneously deciding which risk management
strategy to implement. This decision is driven by a trade-oﬀ between the instantaneous
gain from imprudent risk management and the expected loss of equity value caused by
tail risk realization. We introduce a second order diﬀerential operator Auf(x) such that:
Auf(x) = 1/2σ
2x2f ′′(x) + (µ− u∆µ)xf ′(x)− rf(x), (3)
where u ∈ {0, 1} and f(x) is any contingent claim.
Then, the shareholders' maximization problem can be written as follows:
max
ut∈{0,1}
{AutE(xt)− (1− ut)λ(E(xt)− E(αxt)) + δxt − rD} = 0, (4)
8Equity expropriation represents a maximum feasible penalty under the limited liability of bank
shareholders, allowing for the most eﬃcient design of the incentive mechanism. However, this penalty will
never be applied ex-post, since the incentive-based recapitalization mechanism will completely eliminate
imprudent risk management.
9Note that liquidity injections realized by shareholders in order to ensure the continuity of debt service
are assumed to be costless, since they do not aﬀect asset value and thus do not require asset restructuring.
In contrast, a recapitalization which leads to asset expansion will incur asset restructuring costs.
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where xt is given by (1) and E(x) denotes bank equity value in the absence of the internal
agency problem.
Consequently, bank shareholders have an interest in implementing prudent risk man-
agement, so long as the expected negative jump of equity value caused by a realization
of tail risk exceeds the instantaneous gain from imprudent risk management:
λ(E(x)− E(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x) (5)
Let x∗u be a critical threshold which makes the incentive constraint (5) binding and
let xSL < x
∗
u denote a threshold:
xSL =
−γ2
1− γ2
r
r + λ
D
ν
, (6)
where γ2 < 0 is a root of 1/2σ
2γ(γ − 1) + µγ = r + λ and ν = δ
r−µ+λ < 1.
Result 1 Without any regulatory control, the owner-managed bank will implement pru-
dent risk management for xt ≥ x∗u, will opt for imprudent risk management for xt < x∗u
and will be liquidated by shareholders when xt = x
S
L.
To see the intuition of the above result, consider ﬁrst the optimal choice between a
costly recapitalization and bank liquidation. The fact that r > δ + (µ−∆µ) means that
the return on a one-dollar investment in riskless security would be higher than that on
a one-dollar investment in the bank asset portfolio. Then, whatever the eﬀort strategy
chosen, in the absence of regulatory control bank shareholders will never recapitalize
the bank on their own and will strategically default at the optimal liquidation point.
However, in the neighborhood of the liquidation point, a moral hazard problem emerges
as a consequence of the conﬂict between portfolio risk and tail risk. In fact, when bank
asset value becomes relatively low, bank liquidation is more likely to be triggered by a
continuous decline of bank asset value rather than by a sudden negative jump. As a
result, the bank will "gamble for resurrection", optimally engaging in tail risk in order
to increase asset growth and to move away from the liquidation point. Here, capital
regulation is needed in order to induce the bank to maintain prudent risk management.
A capital regulation literature dealing with the asset substitution problem has shown
that it is possible to prevent a bank from choosing a riskier portfolio by imposing an
appropriate incentive liquidation rule (see, for example, Brattachariya (2002), Décamps
et al. (2004), Koziol and Lowrenz (2012)). The next question is then: why can't we
prevent the bank from engaging in tail risk in a similar way? Why do we need, instead,
to resort to mandatory recapitalizations?
Let us consider the incentives of bank shareholders when the regulator imposes any
arbitrary liquidation rule xL ≥ x̂L, where10
x̂L =
−β2
1− β2
D
η
(7)
where β2 < 0 is a root of 1/2σ
2β(β − 1) + µβ = r and η = δ
r−µ+∆µ < 1.
10Note that x̂L represents the optimal shareholders' closure rule, provided that the bank sticks to
prudent risk management.
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A veriﬁcation of necessary condition (5) shows that it doesn't hold when bank asset
value approaches xL. Thus, in the neighborhood of the mandatory liquidation threshold
the bank will engage in tail risk for the same "gambling-for-resurrection" reasons we
described above.
Result 2 Any mandatory liquidation rule xL ≥ x̂L would be unable to prevent tail risk.
It follows from this result that a mere increase in capital requirements would be in-
suﬃcient to discourage banks from "manufacturing" tail risk. As pointed out by several
recent studies (see, for example, Perotti et al. (2011)), new regulatory tools are required
in order to maintain control over tail risk. Incentive-based mandatory recapitalization
policy could be viewed as one of them. Indeed, the eﬀect of the recapitalization rule will
be diﬀerent from the eﬀect of the liquidation rule. A crucial point is that, under the
mandatory recapitalization rule, asset return volatility cannot lead to the bank's failure.
Thus, the mandatory recapitalization rule will eliminate a conﬂict between portfolio risk
and tail risk. At the same time, realization of tail risk under an imprudent risk manage-
ment strategy will raise the likelihood of mandatory recapitalizations, thereby increasing
the total expected recapitalization costs. It is the very threat of suﬀering the additional
recapitalization costs under tail risk exposure that will induce bank shareholders to pro-
mote prudent risk management in their bank.
Thus, in order to induce shareholders to promote prudent risk management, manda-
tory recapitalization policy should be designed in such a way that: (i) the expected loss
of equity value caused by realized tail risk exceeds the instantaneous gain from imprudent
risk-management; (ii) equity value at the mandatory recapitalization point is suﬃciently
high for shareholders to optimally prefer to recapitalize the bank rather than to be pun-
ished by equity expropriation.
4 Capital regulation when there is no internal agency
problem: a benchmark
In order to track the impact of the internal agency problem on capital regulation, we
ﬁrst design the incentive mandatory recapitalization policy in a setting where the interests
of the bank manager are perfectly aligned with the interests of the bank shareholders.
Let us formally deﬁne the regulatory problem. The regulator is looking for the optimal
combination of recapitalization rule xR and recapitalization coeﬃcient s > 1 which will
prevent imprudent risk management at the bank for ∀x ≥ xR, maximizing bank social
value. Bank social value can be computed as a sum of bank equity value and the market
value of deposits net of any social costs. However, in contrast to mandatory liquidation
or a public bail-out, all costs associated with mandatory recapitalizations will be entirely
borne by bank shareholders. At the same, under the incentive recapitalization mechanism,
the bank will never default, so that the market value of deposits will remain constant.
As a result, if the bank chooses prudent risk management, maximization of bank social
value will be equivalent to maximization of bank equity value. Thus, for any current
bank asset value xt > xR, the regulatory problem can be stated as follows:
Max
xR>0,s>1
E(x) ≥ 0 s.t.
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λ(E(x)− 1x≥xR/αE(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x) for ∀x ≥ xR,
where E(x) is given by
E(x) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)(δxτ − rD − 1{xτ=xR}K(xτ ))dτ
]
(8)
Let ξ1 denote a critical level of marginal recapitalization costs, such that for ξ ≥ ξ1 a
solution of the above problem does not exist:11
ξ1 =
(
1− sβ2
s− 1
)(
λ−∆µ
λ− β2∆µ
)
η + η − 1 (9)
Proposition 1 For ξ1 < ξ1, the regulator can prevent an owner-managed bank from en-
gaging in tail risk, by imposing the optimal mandatory recapitalization policy {s∗, xBR(s∗)}
which implies:
• (i) a recapitalization rule
xBR(s) =
(1− sβ2)λD + ξ0(λ− β2∆µ)
(1− sβ2)(λ−∆µ)η − (1 + ξ1 − η)(s− 1)(λ− β2∆µ) (10)
• (ii) a recapitalization coeﬃcient s∗ = arg minxBR(s).
It can easily be shown that bank equity value is decreasing on xR. Thus, for any
given recapitalization coeﬃcient s > 1, the maximum equity value can be attained under
the minimum feasible recapitalization rule xBR(s) > D, such that λE(x) = ∆µxE
′(x)
at x = xR.
12 Note that E(xBR(s)) > 0. This makes our recapitalization mechanism
enforceable, since shareholders will prefer to recapitalize the bank rather than to be
expropriated of equity. We also verify that, faced with mandatory recapitalization rule
xBR(s), shareholders will not undertake voluntary recapitalizations at any x > x
B
R(s),
since recapitalization costs would always exceed the expected growth of equity value
resulted from capital injections.13 Then, given that bank equity value is decreasing on
recapitalization rule xBR(s), a complete solution of the above regulatory problem will be
delivered by s∗ = arg minxBR(s).
In order to illustrate the optimal mandatory recapitalization policy, we resort to nu-
merical simulations. For the parameter set D = 1, r = 0.04, µ = 0.035, ∆µ = 0.005,
δ = 0.01, σ = 0.2, λ = 0.05, α = 0.7, ξ0 = [0.1 × 10−4, 0.1 × 10−3], ξ1 = [0.01, 0.1],14
xBR(s
∗) varies in the range of (1.12, 1.20) and s∗ takes values between (1.01, 1.08). For
example, for ξ0 = 0.1× 10−3 and ξ1 = 0.1 we obtain xBR(s∗) = 1.20 and s∗ = 1.03, which
11For ξ1 > ξ1 the incentive condition never holds in the neighborhood of xR.
12We show in Appendix B that, if the incentive constraint is respected for x ∈ [xR, xR/α), it will
automatically be respected for any x > xR/α.
13In practice, shareholders are unwilling to undertake voluntary recapitalizations not only because of
the private costs they incur, but also for fear of sending a negative signal about the bank's ﬁnancial
health. Making a recapitalization mandatory, however, might partially mitigate this signaling eﬀect.
14Empirical estimations realized for the set of U.S. ﬁrms provide the following values of average
marginal issuance costs: 2.8% in Gomes (2001), 5.1% in Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000), 10.7% for small
ﬁrms and 5% for large ﬁrms in Hennessy and Whited (2007).
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corresponds to the minimum capital ratio of 16.7% and post-recapitalization capital ratio
of 19, 1% respectively.
The optimal recapitalization coeﬃcient results from the trade-oﬀ between two opposite
eﬀects generated by ﬁxed and proportional recapitalization costs: s∗ is increasing on ξ0
and decreasing on ξ1. Fixed recapitalization costs encourage shareholders to raise a
maximum of funds in order to postpone further mandatory recapitalizations, whereas
proportional costs reduce recapitalization capacity.15 The optimal recapitalization rule
xBR(s
∗) is increasing on both ﬁxed and proportional recapitalization costs. Indeed, given
signiﬁcant recapitalization costs, the bank equity must be strong enough to persuade
shareholders to choose costly recapitalizations over bank liquidation. Moreover, xBR(s
∗)
is increasing on asset volatility, since higher σ exacerbates a trade-oﬀ between tail risk
and portfolio risk, aggravating a moral hazard problem.
5 Capital regulation under the internal agency prob-
lem
Now we turn to the set-up which allows for the internal agency problem. The man-
ager has a diﬀerent perception of tail risk exposure from that of shareholders, since his
objective deviates from the maximization of equity value. Thus, besides the instanta-
neous loss ∆µxtdt in terms of asset growth, the real cost of prudent risk management for
shareholders will be increased by the amount of incentive compensation. In such a con-
text, shareholders have to make two strategic decisions: (i) whether to promote prudent
risk management in their bank and (ii) if so, how to create the appropriate incentives
for the manager at minimum cost. We start by answering the second question, deﬁning
the optimal incentive contract with the manager. Then we incorporate a structure of
the optimal incentive contract into the initial problem of bank shareholders and build the
optimal incentive-based recapitalization policy which will induce shareholders to promote
prudent risk management in their bank.
5.1 The optimal incentive contract
Assume there is some incentive recapitalization policy {xR, s} for which shareholders
ﬁnd it optimal to promote prudent risk management in their bank for ∀x ≥ xR. Then,
we need to ﬁnd an incentive contract which will induce the manager to maintain prudent
risk management at a minimum cost for bank shareholders. We restrict our analysis to
the class of linear contracts, looking for asset-based compensation in this form:
R(x) = w0 + w1x, (11)
where w0 ≥ 0 and w1 ≥ 0.
We analyze the manager's incentives for prudent risk management. Given any con-
tract {xT , R(x), RT}, the manager maximizes contract continuation value, W (x), which
15Décamps et al. (2011) point out the similar eﬀects of recapitalization costs in the context of liquidity
management.
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is contingent on bank asset value and represents the current expected value of total future
gains from managerial position, including any private beneﬁts:
W (x) = E
[∫ τ∧τT
t
e−r(τ−t)(R(xτ ) + (1− uτ )bxτ )dτ + e−r(τT−t)RT
]
, (12)
where uτ ∈ {0, 1}, xτ follows (1) and τT = inf{t ≥ 0 s.t xt ≤ xT}.
Imprudent risk management has an ambiguous eﬀect on the manager's wealth. On the
one hand, it increases contract continuation value due to higher expected asset return
and private beneﬁts. On the other hand, the manager risks losing his position (and,
consequently, the expected value of further payoﬀs) with probability λdt in a short period
of time dt. Then, the manager's maximization problem can be stated as follows:
max
ut∈{0,1}
{AutW (xt) +R(xt)− (1− ut)(λW (xt)− bxt)} = 0 (13)
The manager will choose prudent risk management as long as the expected loss of
contract continuation value under tail-risk exposure exceeds the instantaneous gain from
imprudent risk management. Then, the optimization problem of bank shareholders look-
ing to minimize the costs of creating incentives for the manager, MC(x), can be stated
as follows:
min
xT≥xR,w0≥0,w1≥0,RT
MC(x) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)(1xτ 6=xTR(xτ ) + 1xτ=xTRT )dτ
]
s.t.
λW (x) ≥ ∆µxW ′(x) + bx, ∀x ≥ xR (14)
We can have either xT = xR, which means that the manager will be replaced at the
recapitalization point, or xT = ∅, which means that the manager will be allowed to keep
his position forever if no loss occurs. In Appendix B we compare the minimum value
of shareholders' costs under these alternatives. We show that, faced with xT = xR, the
manager has to be provided with a terminal payoﬀ RT equal to the expected value of
the further contract payoﬀs he could obtain from continuation. Conversely, letting the
manager stay forever provided that no loss occurs would allow shareholders to avoid these
payments.
Proposition 2 The optimal incentive contract which will induce prudent risk manage-
ment at minimum cost implies16
R(x) =
δ
η
b
λ−∆µx ≡ w
∗
1x (15)
The manager is never ﬁred provided no loss occurs, i.e., xT = ∅ and RT = ∅.
The total shareholders' costs associated with the implementation of the optimal incen-
tive contract will coincide with the minimum incentive-compatible contract continuation
value for the manager:
MC∗(x) ≡ W ∗(x) = η
δ
w∗1
(
x+ xR
(
s− 1
1− sβ2
)(
x
xR
)β2)
(16)
16Note that w∗1 > 0, since λ < ∆µ(1− α) < ∆µ.
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It is easy to see that MC∗(x) are increasing with the manager's ability to generate
private gains on the ﬁnancial market, b. In practice, top executives are partially remu-
nerated via equity-based compensation. In the context of our model, this would create
a self-amplifying mechanism: by rewarding the manager with stock options and stocks,
shareholders would increase what he stands to gain from the ﬁnancial markets. In order
to induce prudent risk management, shareholders will have to increase a variable propor-
tion of the incentive compensation, which will again raise risk-taking incentives and so
forth. Thus, it would be useful to maintain control over the proportions of equity-based
compensation within compensation packages, in order to make managers less sensitive to
the short-term reactions of the ﬁnancial markets to their performance.
5.2 The optimal mandatory recapitalization policy
Given the optimal incentive contract with the manager, we are now in a position to
address the initial problem of bank shareholders faced with a decision on whether to in-
duce prudent risk management or to assume tail risk exposure. Given the internal agency
problem, bank shareholders have an interest in promoting prudent risk management in
their bank when the following incentive condition is satisﬁed:
λ(EW ∗(x)− 1x≥xR/αEW ∗(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′W ∗(x) + w∗1x, (17)
where
EW ∗(x) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)((δ − w∗1)xτ − rD − 1{xτ=xR}K(xτ ))dτ
]
(18)
In contrast to the benchmark case, the incentive condition of bank shareholders now
incorporates information on the optimal incentive contract. Then, the regulatory problem
in the context of the internal agency problem becomes:
Max
xR>0,s>1
EW ∗(x) ≥ 0 s.t. (17) for x ≥ xR (19)
Let b denote a critical value of private beneﬁts such that for b ≥ b the solution of the
above problem does not exist:
b = η
(
ξ − ξ
1 + ξ
)
(λ−∆µ), (20)
where ξ1 is given by (9). Indeed, for b < b < δ the incentive condition never holds in the
neighborhood of xR, whereas for b > δ the optimal incentive contract would be too costly
for shareholders.
Proposition 3 If ξ1 < ξ1 and b < b, the regulator can prevent the bank from engaging in
tail risk, by imposing the optimal mandatory recapitalization policy {s∗∗, xAR(s∗∗)} which
implies:
• (i) a recapitalization threshold
xAR(s) =
(1− sβ2)λD + ξ0(λ− β2∆µ)
(1− sβ2)(λ−∆µ)(1− w∗1
δ
)η − (1 + ξ1 − η(1− w
∗
1
δ
))(s− 1)(λ− β2∆µ)
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• (ii) a recapitalization coeﬃcient s∗∗ = arg minxAR(s).
It can be shown that xAR(s) > x
B
R(s) for the same recapitalization coeﬃcient s, so that
an incentive recapitalization policy which does not allow for the internal agency problem
would be unable to prevent the bank from engaging in tail risk. This proves that the
internal agency problem matters and should be taken into account by bank regulators
when designing capital regulation.
It is worth noting that shareholders' costs of creating incentives for the manager
can be reduced through internal random audits. If an audit uncovers imprudent risk
management, the manager should be ﬁred without receiving any terminal pay. This
will increase his risk of losing contract continuation value should there be imprudent
risk management, allowing shareholders to reduce the amount of incentive compensation.
If instantaneous random audit costs are not too high, random audits could increase
shareholders' incentives to promote prudent risk management in their bank, enabling the
regulator to reduce a stringency of capital regulation. Moreover, recall that true bank
asset value must be observable in order to implement the optimal incentive contract.
Since the manager may have the opportunity to manipulate ﬁnancial statements in order
to enjoy higher rewards, random audits could also involve verifying bank asset value,
which would discourage the manager from misreporting.
6 Discussion
6.1 The impact of bonus taxes on risk management
In the aftermath of the 2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis, several European countries (UK,
France, Italy, Greece) introduced a tax on the performance bonuses of bank top manage-
ment. One of the oﬃcial purposes of this measure was to improve the risk-management
culture in the banking sector. We now use our model to examine the eﬀect of bonus taxes
on shareholders' incentives to promote prudent risk management in their bank.
Let a tax rate τ be applied to the variable proportion of managerial compensation
w1x which might be interpreted as a performance bonus. Assume ﬁrst that taxes are
paid by bank shareholders. In this case, bonus taxes have no impact on the manager's
incentives, so that bank shareholders can induce prudent risk management by using the
same optimal incentive contract as in a tax-free world. However, total shareholders'
costs of creating incentives will be increased by the amount of taxes and will be equal to
MC(x) = (1 + τ)W ∗(x), where W ∗(x) is deﬁned in (16). Consider now the alternative
setting, where bonus taxes are paid by the bank manager.17 To be motivated to maintain
prudent risk management, the manager should have at least the same level of wealth after
the tax levy as in a tax-free world. Then, the minimum incentive contract continuation
value that should be oﬀered to the manager will be given by MC(x) = 1/(1− τ)W ∗(x).
The ﬁrst conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that bonus taxes are
inappropriate for dealing with excessive risk-taking in banks. Under both scenarios, they
increase the real shareholders' cost of promoting prudent risk management and thus
would lead to a situation requiring tougher capital regulation.18 It is also easy to see that
17We assume that bonus taxes are paid immediately after receiving compensation.
18In fact, the eﬀect of bonus taxes is equivalent to the eﬀect produced by increasing b.
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total shareholders' costs of creating incentives when bonus taxes are paid by the manager
would be higher than when bonus taxes are paid by the shareholders themselves. Thus,
the lesser of two evils would be to collect bonus taxes from bank shareholders rather than
from bank managers, which is consistent with the bonus tax policies adopted in UK and
France in 2009-2010.
6.2 Implicit vs explicit regulation of managerial pay
There is now convincing empirical evidence that equity-based compensations have
made bank executives willing to increase bank equity value at any price in order to reap
gains (Chen et al. (2006), Williams et al. (2008), Vallascas and Hagendorﬀ (2010)).
In order to improve the risk-management culture in the banking sector, many academics
and policymakers call for the explicit regulation of executive pay(Bebchuk and Spamann
(2010), Bolton et al. (2010)). However, this proposal raises a range of concerns. The
ﬁrst problem is that regulators do not dispose of all the information needed for the
eﬃcient design and enforcement of executive compensation policy. Second, it is still
unclear what form the optimal incentive compensation structure should take. Finally,
experience suggests that economic agents always ﬁnd a way to get around regulations if
their incentives diverge from regulatory purposes. Thus, explicitly regulating executive
pay without regulating shareholders' incentives would probably be a waste of regulatory
resources. These reasons argue for implicit control over managerial incentives. The
detailed design of managerial compensation should be left to bank shareholders; the role
of the bank regulator is to ensure that shareholders have suﬃcient incentives to promote
prudent risk management in their banks.
6.3 Capital requirements and insurance protection
The last relevant question is whether capital requirements should be reduced if a bank
acquires an insurance policy against tail risk. Actually, only the advanced approach of
the Basel II capital requirements considers an insurance policy as a risk mitigation tool
and authorizes banks holding such policies to operate with reduced mandatory capital.
However, it seems that greater reliance on insurance protection may aggravate the prob-
lem of moral hazard. The point is that an insurance policy allows banks to transfer risk
without tackling it at source, i.e., it helps to reallocate risks but cannot prevent their
accumulation within the ﬁnancial system. Moreover, in the context of a systemic cri-
sis, insurance companies themselves may experience serious ﬁnancial problems,19 being
therefore unable to provide loss coverage. Thus, even though recourse to insurance may
be beneﬁcial for bank shareholders (i.e., it might be cheaper to buy an insurance policy
than to create appropriate incentives for the manager), prudent risk management would
be the only durable solution from the perspective of social welfare. Banks can be allowed
to buy insurance protection against some external risks (like external fraud, hacking at-
tacks, natural disasters), since an insurance policy will not promote moral hazard and
risk accumulation in these cases. At the same time, regulators should induce banks to
19This happened to AIG, one of the biggest players on the world insurance market, bailed out by the
Federal Reserve Bank and the U.S. Treasury in 2008.
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tackle the sources of internal risk. As we have shown, this can be realized by means of the
incentive mandatory recapitalization policy which allows for the internal agency problem.
7 Conclusion
This study is an attempt to rethink the approach to bank capital regulation in response
to the huge incentive distortions revealed by the 2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis. We design a
mandatory recapitalization policy, which deals with "manufactured" tail risk in banking.
We show how, through the appropriate choice of mandatory recapitalization parameters,
the regulator can induce bank shareholders to put in place an incentive compensation
scheme that will deter bank managers from engaging in tail risk. We restrict our analysis
to the class of linear contracts and derive the optimal incentive compensation in explicit
form. It appears to be optimal to oﬀer the manager a contract of indeﬁnite duration.
Otherwise, at the contract termination date, the manager would have to be granted a
positive terminal payoﬀ equal to the remaining contract continuation value, which would
impose additional costs on bank shareholders.
Since the internal agency problem makes it costly for bank shareholders to promote
prudent risk-taking behavior by bank managers, shareholders should be required to main-
tain a larger stake in the game. This might be viewed as a justiﬁcation for more stringent
capital requirements for systemically important banks, which typically have both severe
agency problems and a predisposition to large losses. However, as we have shown, merely
increasing capital requirements would not prevent banks from engaging in tail risk. For
this reason, we suggest implementing capital regulation in the form of the incentive-based
recapitalization policy.
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Appendix A. Valuation of contingent claims
A.1. Equity value in the benchmark case
Let xR be any arbitrary recapitalization rule. LetK(x) denote the total costs shareholders
incur when issuing new equity:
K(x) = (ξ1 + 1)(s− 1)x+ ξ0
Equity value in the absence of the internal agency problem is given by
E(x) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)(δxτ − rD − 1{xτ=xR}K(xτ ))dτ
]
(A1)
Solving a corresponding ODE
1/2σ2x2E ′′(x) + (µ−∆µ)xE ′(x)− rE(x) + δx− rD = 0, (A2)
under the boundary condition
E(xR) = E(sxR)−K(xR), (A3)
we obtain
E(x) = −
[
ξ0 + (ξ1 + 1− η)(s− 1)xR
1− sβ2
](
x
xR
)β2
+ ηx−D, (A4)
where η = δ
r−µ+∆µ < 1 and β2 < 0 is a root of the characteristic equation
1/2σ2β(β − 1) + (µ−∆µ)β = r
A.2. Equity value under the optimal incentive contract
Given the optimal incentive contract {xT = ∅, R(x) = w∗1x,RT = ∅} where w∗1 = δη bλ−∆µ ,
bank equity value follows
EW ∗(x) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)((δ − w∗1)xτ − rD − 1{xτ=xR}K(xτ ))dτ
]
(A5)
Solving a corresponding ODE
1/2σ2x2E ′′W ∗(x) + (µ−∆µ)xE ′W ∗(x)− rEW ∗(x) + (δ − w∗1)x− rD = 0, (A6)
under the boundary condition EW ∗(xR) = EW ∗(sxR)−K(xR), we obtain
EW ∗(x) = −
[
ξ0 + (1 + ξ1 − (1− w
∗
1
δ
)η)(s− 1)xR
1− sβ2
](
x
xR
)β2
+
(
1− w
∗
1
δ
)
ηx−D (A7)
A.3. Equity value in a jump-diﬀusion framework
Let xL be any arbitrary liquidation rule. Consider the case when only the imprudent
risk-management technology is available and let us design equity value under permanent
tail risk exposure.
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A.3.1. General solution
Given xi = xL/α
i, i = 0..+∞, let Ei(x) be bank equity value on the interval [xi, xi+1).
a) First, we construct equity value on the interval [x0, x1). Since a large loss on this
interval will lead to the bank default, equity value satisﬁes the equation:
1
2
σ2x2E ′′0 (x) + µxE
′
0(x)− (r + λ)E0(x) + δx− rD = 0 (A8)
Let γ1 > 0 and γ2 < 0 be the roots of
1/2σ2γ(γ − 1) + µγ = r + λ (A9)
A general solution of equation (A8) will be given by:
E0(x) = C0,1x
γ1 + C0,2x
γ2 + A0,1x+ A0,0 (A10)
where C0,1, C0,2 are any arbitrary constants and
A0,1 =
δ
r − µ+ λ ≡ ν, A0,0 = −
r
r + λ
D (A11)
Note that, from initial assumptions r > δ + µ − ∆µ and ∆µ < λ(1 − α), it follows
that δ < r − µ+ λ and, therefore, ν < 1.
b) On each interval [xi, xi+1), i = 1..+∞, equity value satisﬁes:
1
2
σ2x2E ′′i (x) + µxE
′
i(x)− (r + λ)Ei(x) + δx− rD = −λEi−1(αx) (A12)
A general solution of the above equation is given by:
Ei(x) = Ci,1(x)x
γ1 + Ci,2(x)x
γ2 + Ai,1x+ Ai,0 (A13)
By substituting (A13) into (A12) and by equating identical terms, we get 4 equations
which iteratively deﬁne coeﬃcients Ci,1(x), Ci,2(x), Ai,1, Ai,0:
1/2σ2x2C ′′i,1(x) + (σ
2γ1 + µ)xC
′
i,1(x) = −λαγ1Ci−1,1(αx) (A14)
1/2σ2x2C ′′i,2(x) + (σ
2γ2 + µ)xC
′
i,2(x) = −λαγ2Ci−1,2(αx) (A15)
Ai,1 = A0,1
(
1 +
αλAi−1,1
δ
)
= A0,1
δ
δ − αλ
[
1−
(
αλ
δ
)i+1]
(A16)
Ai,0 = − r
r + λ
D +
λ
r + λ
Ai−1,0 = A0,0
r + λ
r
[
1−
(
λ
r + λ
)i+1]
(A17)
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A.3.2. Recursive algorithm to compute unknown coeﬃcients Ci,1(x)
and Ci,2(x)
Consider the following non-homogeneous second-order ODE:
f ′′(x) + q(x)f ′(x) = q0g(x) (A18)
where f(x) ∈ C2, q(x) ∈ C0, g(x) ∈ C0 and q0 is any arbitrary constant.
A general solution of the above equation is given as follows:
f(x) = a1f1(x) + a2f2(x) + q0fp(x), (A19)
where f1(x) and f2(x) are two solutions of the homogeneous equation, a1, a2 are any
arbitrary coeﬃcients and fp(x) is a particular solution which can be deﬁned by using the
method of the variation of parameters:
fp(x) = −f1(x)
(∫
f2(x)g(x)
W (f1(x), f2(x))
dx+ c1
)
+ f2(x)
(∫
f1(x)g(x)
W (f1(x), f2(x))
dx+ c2
)
,
(A20)
where
W (f1(x), f2(x)) = f1(x)f
′
2(x)− f ′1(x)f2(x) 6= 0
is a Wronskian and c1, c2 are any arbitrary constants of integration.
Thus, (A19) can be rewritten as follows:
f(x) = k1f1(x)+k2f2(x)−q0
(
f1(x)
∫
f2(x)g(x)
W (f1(x), f2(x))
dx− f2(x)
∫
f1(x)g(x)
W (f1(x), f2(x))
dx
)
,
(A21)
where k1 = a1 − q0c1 and k2 = a2 + q0c2.
We can rewrite equations (A14) and (A15) in the form of (A18):
C ′′i,1(x) +
2(γ1 + µσ
−2)
x
C ′i,1(x) = −
2λαγ1
σ2
Ci−1,1(αx)
x2
(A22)
C ′′i,2(x) +
2(γ1 + µσ
−2)
x
C ′i,2(x) = −
2λαγ2
σ2
Ci−1,2(αx)
x2
(A23)
Let
θj = 1− 2(γj + µσ−2), j ∈ {1, 2}
A general solutions of (A22) is given by:
Ci,1(x) = ki,0 · 1 + ki,1xθ1 + 2λα
γ1
σ2
φi(x), (A24)
where ki,0, ki,1 are any arbitrary constants and
φi(x) =
1
θ1
(∫
Ci−1,1(αx)
x
dx− xθ1
∫
Ci−1,1(αx)
x
x−θ1dx
)
(A25)
A general solutions for (A23) is given by:
Ci,2(x) = pi,0 · 1 + pi,1xθ2 + 2λα
γ2
σ2
ϕi(x), (A26)
16
where pi,0, pi,1 are any arbitrary constants and
ϕi(x) =
1
θ2
(∫
Ci−1,2(αx)
x
dx− xθ2
∫
Ci−1,2(αx)
x
x−θ2dx
)
(A27)
Note that, for each xi = xL/α
i, i = 1..+∞, the following conditions should be satisﬁed:
Ei−1(xi) = Ei(xi) (A28)
E ′i−1(xi) = E
′
i(xi) (A29)
We denote
∆Ai,1 = Ai,1 − Ai−1,1 = A0,1
(
αλ
δ
)i
(A30)
∆Ai,0 = Ai,0 − Ai−1,0 = A0,0
(
λ
r + λ
)i
(A31)
∆C ′i,1(x) = C
′
i,1(x)− C ′i−1,1(x) = θ1xθ1−1(ki,1 − ki−1,1) +
2λαγ1
σ2
[φ′i(x)− φ′i−1(x)] (A32)
∆C ′i,2(x) = C
′
i,2(x)− C ′i−1,2(x) = θ2xθ2−1(pi,1 − pi−1,1) +
2λαγ2
σ2
[ϕ′i(x)− ϕ′i−1(x)] (A33)
Given (A13), equations (A28) and (A29) enable us to establish a link between coeﬃ-
cients on contiguous regions:
Ci,1(xi) = Ci−1,1(xi)−
[
(1− γ2)∆Ai,1x1−γ1i − γ2∆Ai,0x−γ1i + xi(∆C ′i,1(xi) + ∆C ′i,2(xi)xγ2−γ1i )
γ1 − γ2
]
(A34)
and
Ci,2(xi) = Ci−1,2(xi)+
[
(1− γ1)∆Ai,1x1−γ2i − γ1∆Ai,0x−γ2i + xi(∆C ′i,1(xi)xγ1−γ2i + ∆C ′i,2(xi))
γ1 − γ2
]
(A35)
Given the recursive nature of (A34), we can rewrite coeﬃcient Ci,1(xi) as a function
of coeﬃcient C0,1:
Ci,1(xi) = C0,1 −
[
(1− γ2)ai,1x1−γ1i − γ2ai,2x−γ1i +Gi,1(ki,1; pi,1;xi)
γ1 − γ2
]
(A36)
where
ai,1 ≡
i∑
n=1
∆An,1 = A0,1
αλ
δ − αλ
[
1−
(
αλ
δ
)i]
= Ai−1,1
αλ
δ
(A37)
ai,2 ≡
i∑
n=1
∆An,0 = A0,0
λ
r
[
1−
(
λ
r + λ
)i]
= Ai−1,0
λ
r + λ
(A38)
Gi,1(ki,1, pi,1, xi) = xi
i∑
n=1
∆C ′n,1(xi) + x
γ2−γ1+1
i
i∑
n=1
∆C ′n,2(xi), (A39)
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where ∆C ′n,1(xi) and ∆C
′
n,2(xi) are given by (A32) and (A33) respectively.
In a similar way we can express Ci,2(xi) as a function of C0,2:
Ci,2(xi) = C0,2 +
[
(1− γ1)ai,1x1−γ2i − γ1ai,2x−γ2i +Gi,2(ki,1; pi,1;xi)
γ1 − γ2
]
(A40)
where
Gi,2(ki,1; pi,1;xi) = x
γ1−γ2+1
i
i∑
n=1
∆C ′n,1(xi) + xi
i∑
n=1
∆C ′n,2(xi) (A41)
Equating the right parts of (A36) and (A24) evaluated at xi, as well as the right parts
of (A40) and (A26), we can set
ki,0 = C0,1 (A42)
and
pi,0 = C0,2 (A43)
for i = 1..+∞.
Then, for ∀i = 1..+∞, ki,1 and pi,1 will be given by the following system of equations:
Pi =

Gi,1(ki,1;pi,1;xi)
γ1−γ2 + ki,1x
θ1
i = −
[
(1−γ2)ai,1x1−γ1i +γ2ai,2x
−γ1
i
γ1−γ2
]
− 2λαγ1
σ2
φi(xi)
Gi,2(ki,1;pi,1;xi)
γ1−γ2 − pi,1x
θ2
i = −
[
(1−γ1)ai,1x1−γ2i −γ1ai,2x
−γ2
i
γ1−γ2
]
+ 2λα
γ2
σ2
ϕi(x)
(A44)
A.3.2. A choice of C0,1 and C0,2
We make a guess that
C0,1 = 0, C0,2 =
(
r
r + λ
D − νxL
)
xL
−γ2 (A45)
Let Eα0(x) denote the bank equity value when α = 0, i. e., when a large loss will lead
to a complete destruction of bank asset. It follows ODE:
1
2
σ2x2E ′′α0(x) + µxE
′
α0
(x)− (r + λ)Eα0(x) + δx− rD = 0 (A46)
Let Eλ0(x) denote bank equity value when λ = 0, i.e., there is no tail risk exposure.
It follows ODE:
1
2
σ2x2E ′′λ0(x) + µxE
′
λ0
(x)− rEλ0(x) + δx− rD = 0 (A47)
We are going to verify that, given C0,1 and C0,2 deﬁned in (A45), the following limit
conditions are satisﬁed:
• (i) limα→0E0(x)→ Eα0(x)
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• (ii) limλ→0E0(x)→ Eλ0(x)
A general solution for Eα0(x) will be given by
Eα0(x) = aα0x
γ1 + bα0x
γ2 + νx− r
r + λ
D, (A48)
Given terminal condition at xL and no-bubble condition for x→ +∞, we have
aα0 = 0, bα0 =
(
r
r + λ
D − νxL
)
xL
−γ2 (A49)
Thus, limit condition (i) is satisﬁed.
A solution for Eλ0(x) will be given by
Eλ0(x) = aλ0x
γˆ1 + bλ0x
γˆ2 +
δ
r − µx−D, (A50)
where γˆ1 > 0, γˆ2 < 0 are the roots of characteristic equation
1/2σ2γˆ(γˆ − 1) + µγˆ = r
and
aλ0 = 0, bλ0 =
(
D − δ
r − µxL
)
xL
−γˆ2 (A51)
Given that limλ→0 γ2 → γˆ2, it can be easily shown that condition (ii) is satisﬁed as
well.
A.3.3. The optimal shareholders' liquidation rule
In order to avoid time consistency problem, the choice of the optimal shareholders'
liquidation rule should be realized for x ∈ [x0, x1), where equity value follows:
E0(x) =
(
r
r + λ
D − νxL
)(
x
xL
)γ2
+ νx− r
r + λ
D, (A52)
Then, from ∂E0(x)
∂xL
= 0, we get
xSL =
−γ2
1− γ2
r
r + λ
D
ν
(A53)
A.3.4. A summary of the recursive algorithm
Given the couple {C0,1, C0,2}, the sequence of coeﬃcients {Ci,1(x), Ci,2(x)}, i = 1.. +∞,
can be deﬁned according to the following iterative procedure:
• for each i, use Ci−1,1(xi) and Ci−1,2(xi) (which are already known) to deﬁne φi(xi)
and ϕi(x) according to (A25) and (A27) respectively;
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• using the series of {k∗n,1, p∗n,1}, n = 1..i−1, calculateGi,1(ki,1; pi,1;xi) andGi,2(ki,1; pi,1;xi)
which will be the functions of ki,1 and pi,1;
• after solving the system Pi, which is linear on k∗i,1 and p∗i,1, compute coeﬃcients
{Ci,1(x), Ci,2(x)} according to:
Ci,1(x) = C0,1 + k
∗
i,1x
θ1 +
2λαγ1
σ2
φi(x) (A54)
Ci,2(x) = C0,2 + p
∗
i,1x
θ2 +
2λαγ2
σ2
ϕi(x) (A55)
Example 1 Let us deﬁne coeﬃcients C1,1(x) and C1,2(x). Given {C0,1, C0,2}, we obtain
φ1(x) =
C0,1
θ1
(
ln(x) +
1
θ1
)
, ϕ1(x) =
C0,2
θ2
(
ln(x) +
1
θ2
)
(A56)
Then, given that k0,1 = 0 and p0,1 = 0,
∆C ′1,1(x) = C
′
1,1(x) = x
−1
(
θ1x
θ1k1,1 +
2λαγ1
σ2
C0,1
θ1
)
(A57)
∆C ′1,2(x) = C
′
1,2(x) = x
−1
(
θ2x
θ2p1,1 +
2λαγ2
σ2
C0,2
θ2
)
(A58)
a1,1 = A0,1
αλ
δ
, a1,2 = A0,0
λ
r + λ
(A59)
G1,1(k1,1; p1,1;x1) = θ1x
θ1
1 k1,1 +
2λαγ1
σ2
C0,1
θ1
+ xγ2−γ11
(
θ2x
θ2
1 p1,1 +
2λαγ2
σ2
C0,2
θ2
)
(A60)
G1,2(k1,1; p1,1;x1) = x
γ1−γ2
1
(
θ1x
θ1
1 k1,1 +
2λαγ1
σ2
C0,1
θ1
)
+ θ2x
θ2
1 p1,1 +
2λαγ2
σ2
C0,2
θ2
(A61)
Then, unknown parameters k1,1, p1,1 can be uncovered from system P1 deﬁned in
(A44), and coeﬃcients C1,1(x), C1,2(x) will be provided by expressions (A54) and (A55)
respectively.
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Appendix B. Proofs
Lemma 1 For any θ < 0, α ∈ (0, 1) and ∆µ < λ(1− α), it follows that
λ(1− αθ)− θ∆µ < 0
Proof of Lemma 1
Given that ∆µ < λ(1− α) and θ < 0, we have:
λ(1− αθ)− θ∆µ < λ(1− αθ)− θλ(1− α) ≡ f(α) (B1)
Since f(1) = 0 and f ′(α) = θλ(1 − αθ−1) > 0 for α ∈ (0, 1), we have f(α) < 0 for
α ∈ (0, 1). Hence, λ(1− αθ)− θ∆µ < 0.
Proof of Result 1
Consider the optimal strategy of bank shareholders when there is nether internal agency
problem nor capital regulation. Bank shareholders maximize equity value E(x), by choos-
ing (i) a liquidation/recapitalization rule; (ii) risk management strategy, ut ∈ {0, 1}.
Let EJ(x) denote bank asset value constructed in Appendix A.3. Consider the share-
holders' liquidation rule derived in Appendix A.3.3:
xSL =
−γ2
1− γ2
r
r + λ
D
ν
(B2)
Let u∗ denote risk management strategy such that:
u∗ =
{
0 x ∈ [xSL, x∗u)
1 x ≥ x∗u
where x∗u is a critical threshold given by:
λ(EJ(x)− EJ(αx)) = ∆µxE ′J(x) (B3)
Equity value constructed under {xSL, u∗} is given as follows:
E∗(x) =
EJ(x) x ∈ [x
S
L, x
∗
u)
(EJ(x
∗
u)− ηx∗u +D)
(
x
x∗u
)β2
+ ηx−D x ≥ x∗u
where β2 < 0 is a root of 1/2σ
2β(β − 1) + (µ−∆µ)β = r.
Let us show that E∗(x) = supxL,ut∈{0,1}E(x), so that {xSL, x∗u} is the optimal share-
holders' strategy in the absence of regulatory control.
Recall that by the initial assumption, r > δ + µ−∆µ. This means that a one-dollar
investment in riskless security will bring more that a one-dollar investment in bank asset
portfolio, so that recapitalization is never optimal.
Let us now show that u∗ is the optimal risk management strategy. First, we verify
that ut = 1 for x > x
∗
u. The corresponding necessary condition implies:
λ(E(x)− E(αx)) > ∆µxE ′(x) for x > x∗u (B4)
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Replacing equity value into (B4), we get:
(EJ(x
∗
u)− ηx∗u +D) (λ(1− αβ2)− β2∆µ)
(
x
x∗u
)β2
+ (λ(1− α)−∆µ)ηx > 0 (B5)
By Lemma 1, we have λ(1 − αβ2) − β2∆µ < 0, while λ(1 − α) − ∆µ > 0 by the
initial assumption. Then, using the fact that (B5) is binding at x∗u, we conclude that
EJ(x
∗
u)− ηx∗u +D > 0. Then, a ﬁrst derivative of the left part of (B5) is increasing on x,
so that condition (B5) will hold for ∀x > x∗u.
Since x∗u is unique, ut = 0 for x < x
∗
u and equity value on this region will be deﬁned
as described in Appendix A.3. Then, by construction, xSL will be the optimal liquidation
rule.
Proof of Result 2
Consider any arbitrary liquidation threshold xL. Assume that the bank will never switch
to the imprudent risk-management strategy for x ≥ xL. Then, bank equity value would
follow:
E(x) = (D − ηxL)
(
x
xL
)β2
+ ηx−D (B6)
Let us show that, given bank equity value (B6), incentive condition (5) doesn't hold
for ∀xL > x̂L. For x ∈ [xL, xL/α) a large loss would trigger bank liquidation, so that
incentive condition (5) can be rewritten as follows:
λE(x) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x) (B7)
Thus, we have:
(λ− β2∆µ) (D − ηxL)
(
x
xL
)β2
+ (λ−∆µ)ηx− λD ≥ 0 (B8)
Let f(x) denote the left-hand side of (B8). Then, we have:
lim
x→xL
f(x) = ∆µ(ηxL(β2 − 1)− β2D) < 0, (B9)
for ∀xL > x̂L, where x̂L is given by
x̂L =
β2
β2 − 1
D
η
(B10)
Therefore, condition (B7) doesn't hold for ∀xL > x̂L.
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the regulatory problem in the case of the owner-managed bank:
Max
xR>0,s>1
E(x) ≥ 0 s.t.
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λ(E(x)− 1x≥xR/αE(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′(x) for ∀x ≥ xR
where E(x) is given by (A4).
For any s > 1, consider a minimum incentive-compatible recapitalization rule xBR(s)
such that λE(xBR(s)) = ∆µx
B
R(s)E
′(xBR(s)):
xBR(s) =
(1− sβ2)λD + ξ0(λ− β2∆µ)
(1− sβ2)(λ−∆µ)η − (ξ1 + 1− η)(s− 1)(λ− β2∆µ) (B11)
Let us show that the pair s∗ = arg minxBR(s) and x
B
R(s
∗) is a solution of the above
maximization problem if
ξ1 <
(
1− sβ2
s− 1
)(
λ−∆µ
λ− β2∆µ
)
η + η − 1 ≡ ξ1 (B12)
P1.1. Incentive-compatibility
For any arbitrary recapitalization coeﬃcient s > 1, let us check that xBR(s) ensures the
incentive constraint of bank shareholders for ∀x ≥ xBR(s). Replacing equity value (A4)
into the incentive condition, for x ∈ [xBR(s), xBR(s)/α) we must have:
−(λ−β2∆µ)
(
ξ0 + (ξ1 + 1− η)(s− 1)xBR(s)
1− sβ2
)(
x
xBR(s)
)β2
+(λ−∆µ)ηx−λD ≥ 0 (B13)
Since the above condition is binding at x = xBR(s) and its left-hand side is increasing
on x, it holds for ∀x ∈ [xBR(s), xBR(s)/α). For x ≥ xBR(s)/α, we must have:
−(λ(1−αβ2)−β2∆µ)
(
ξ0 + (ξ1 + 1− η)(s− 1)xBR(s)
1− sβ2
)(
x
xBR(s)
)β2
+(λ(1−α)−∆µ)ηx ≥ 0
(B14)
By Lemma 1, λ(1 − αβ2) − β2∆µ < 0 and ∆µ < λ(1 − α) by the initial assumption.
Therefore, (B14) holds for x ≥ xBR(s)/α.
P1.2. Feasibility
Condition (B12) ensures that xBR(s) > 0. Now, we verify that (i) it is optimal to re-
capitalize the bank at xBR(s), rather than to lose equity; (ii) given x
B
R(s), a voluntary
recapitalization at any x > xBR(s) is unoptimal.
First, we check that E(xBR(s)) > 0. Let x
O
R(s) denote a critical recapitalization thresh-
old such that E(xOR(s)) = 0:
xOR(s) =
(1− sβ2)D + ξ0
(1− sβ2)η − (ξ1 + 1− η)(s− 1) > D (B15)
In can be shown that xBR(s) > x
O
R(s), so that E(x
B
R(s)) > 0.
In order to show that there is no other recapitalization rule that could strictly increase
equity value, it is suﬃcient to verify the following condition for x > xBR(s):
g(x) ≡ E(sx)− E(x)−K(x) < 0 (B16)
We have g′(x) < 0, g′′(x) > 0 and g(xBR(s)) = 0. Thus, (B16) holds for x > x
B
R(s).
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P1.3. Optimality
Let us show that {s∗, xBR(s∗)} is the optimal recapitalization policy. Note that E(x) is
decreasing on xR. Under ξ1 < ξ1, x
B
R(s) is the optimal incentive-compatible recapital-
ization rule for any given s > 1. Then, a solution of the maximization problem will be
delivered by s∗ = arg minxBR(s).
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume there exists some incentive recapitalization policy {xR, s}, such that shareholders
want to induce prudent risk management in their bank for ∀x ≥ xR. Then, the share-
holders' maximization problem is reduced to minimization of the total expected amount
of incentive managerial compensation:
min
xT≥xR,w0≥0,w1≥0,RT≥0
MC(x) = E
[∫ +∞
t
e−r(τ−t)(1xτ 6=xTR(xτ ) + 1xτ=xTRT )dτ
]
s.t.
λW (x) ≥ ∆µxW ′(x) + bx (B17)
where R(xτ ) = w0 + w1xτ and
W (x) = E
[∫ τ∧τT
t
e−r(τ−t)R(xτ )dτ + e−r(τT−t)RT
]
(B18)
Contract continuation value W (x) follows ODE:
1/2σ2x2W ′′(x) + (µ−∆µ)xW ′(x)− rW (x) + w0 + w1x = 0 (B19)
Under the no-bubble condition, a general solution of (B19) is given by:
W (x) = C0x
β2 +
η
δ
w1x+
w0
r
, (B20)
where C0 is any constant depending on the boundary condition at xT .
Let consider two alternative cases: xT = xR and xT = ∅.
1) Case 1: xT = xR. Under the boundary condition W (xR) = RT , we get
W (x) =
w0
r
+
η
δ
w1x+
(
RT − w0
r
− η
δ
w1xR
)( x
xR
)β2
(B21)
Given that MC(xR) = MC(sxR) + RT in this case, the shareholders' optimization
problem can be rewritten as follows:
min
w0≥0,w1≥0,RT≥0
MC(x) =
{
w0
r
+
η
δ
w1x+
RT +
η
δ
w1xR(s− 1)
(1− sβ2)
(
x
xR
)β2}
s.t.
(λ−∆µβ2)
(
RT − w0
r
− η
δ
w1xR
)( x
xR
)β2
+ (λ−∆µ)η
δ
w1x+ λ
w0
r
≥ bx (B22)
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The solution of the above problem is given by
w∗0 = 0, w
∗
1 =
δ
η
b
λ−∆µ, R
∗
T =
η
δ
w∗1xR
The optimal value of MC(x) is given by:
MC∗1(x) =
η
δ
w∗1
(
x+ xR
s
(1− sβ2)
(
x
xR
)β2)
(B23)
2) Case 2: xT = ∅. Note that, in this case, RT = ∅ and MC(x) = W (x), so that the
shareholders' problem takes the following form:
min
w0≥0,w1≥0
MC(x) =
{
w0
r
+
η
δ
w1x+
η
δ
w1
(s− 1)
(1− sβ2)xR
(
x
xR
)β2}
s.t.
(λ−∆µβ2)η
δ
w1
(s− 1)
(1− sβ2)xR
(
x
xR
)β2
+ (λ−∆µ)η
δ
w1x+ λ
w0
r
≥ bx (B24)
The couple w∗0 = 0 and w
∗
1 =
δ
η
b
λ−∆µ solves the above problem. The corresponding
value of shareholders' costs is given by:
MC∗2(x) =
η
δ
w∗1
(
x+ xR
(s− 1)
(1− sβ2)
(
x
xR
)β2)
≡ W ∗(x) (B25)
Since MC∗2(x) < MC
∗
1(x), the optimal incentive-compatible contract will be deﬁned
by the triple {
xT = ∅, R(x) = δ
η
b
λ−∆µx ≡ w
∗
1x, RT = ∅
}
Proof of Proposition 3
Allowing for the internal agency problem between bank shareholders and the bank man-
ager, the regulatory problem transforms to:
Max
xR>0,s>1
EW ∗(x) ≥ 0 s.t.
λ(EW ∗(x)− 1x≥xR/αEW ∗(αx)) ≥ ∆µxE ′W ∗(x) for ∀x ≥ xR
where EW ∗(x0) is given by (A7).
For any s > 1, consider the minimum incentive-compatible recapitalization rule xAR(s)
such that λEW ∗(x
A
R(s)) = ∆µx
A
R(s)E
′
W ∗(x
A
R(s)):
xAR(s) =
(1− sβ2)λD + ξ0(λ− β2∆µ)
(1− sβ2)(λ−∆µ)(1− w∗1
δ
)η − (1 + ξ1 − η(1− w
∗
1
δ
))(s− 1)(λ− β2∆µ)
, (B26)
given that
b < η
(
ξ − ξ
1 + ξ
)
(λ−∆µ) ≡ b, (B27)
where ξ1 is deﬁned by (9).
Let us show that the pair s∗∗ = arg minxAR(s) and x
A
R(s
∗∗) is a solution of the above
maximization problem.
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P3.1. Incentive-compatibility
For any arbitrary recapitalization coeﬃcient s > 1, let us check that xAR(s) ensures the
incentive constraint of bank shareholders for ∀x ≥ xAR(s). Replacing equity value (A7)
into the incentive condition, for x ∈ [xAR(s), xAR(s)/α) we must have:
−(λ− β2∆µ)H(s)
(
x
xAR(s)
)β2
+ (λ−∆µ)
(
1− w
∗
1
δ
)
ηx ≥ λD (B28)
where H(s) denote:
H(s) =
ξ0 +
(
1 + ξ1 − η(1− w
∗
1
δ
)
)
(s− 1)xAR(s)
1− sβ2
Since condition (B28) is binding for x = xAR(s) and its left-hand side is increasing on
x when w∗ < δ, it holds for ∀x ∈ [xAR(s), xAR(s)/α). For x ≥ xAR(s)/α, we must have:
−(λ(1− αβ2)− β2∆µ)H(s)
(
x
xAR(s)
)β2
+ (λ(1− α)−∆µ)
(
1− w
∗
1
δ
)
ηx ≥ 0 (B29)
By Lemma 1, λ(1− αβ2)−∆µβ2 < 0 and thus (B29) holds x ≥ xAR(s)/α.
P3.2. Feasibility
Condition (B27) ensures that xAR(s) > 0. For any given s > 1, we have x
A
R(s) > x
B
R(s) > 0.
Thus, given xAR(s), shareholders will optimally prefer to recapitalize the bank rather than
to be deprived of equity. At the same time, in order to ensure that, faced with xAR(s),
shareholders will not recapitalize the bank at any x > xAR(s), we must have:
gW ∗(x) ≡ EW ∗(sx)− EW ∗(x)−K(x) < 0, (B30)
where W ∗(x) is a terminal payoﬀ to the manager.
We have g′W ∗(x) < 0, g
′′
W ∗(x) > 0 and gW ∗(x
A
R(s)) = 0. Thus, (B30) holds for any
x > xAR(s).
P3.3. Optimality
Since EW ∗(x) is decreasing on xR, x
A
R(s) is a solution of the regulatory maximization
problem for any s > 1 and b < b.20 Then, the choice s∗∗ = arg minxAR(s) completes the
solution of the maximization problem.
20For b < b < δ the incentive condition never holds in the neighborhood of the recapitalization
threshold, whereas for b > δ the optimal incentive contract would be too costly for shareholders.
26
References
[1] Admati, A., DeMarzo, P., Hellwig, M., Pﬂeiderer, P., 2011. Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts,
and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expen-
sive. Unpublished manuscript.
[2] Acharya, V., Pagano, M., and P. Volpin, 2012. Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking
and Competition for Managerial Talent. AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper.
[3] Acharya, V.,T. Cooley, M. Richardson and I. Walter, 2010. Manufacturing Tail Risk:
A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007-09. Foundations and Trends in Finance
4, 247-325.
[4] Bebchuk, L., and H. Spamann, 2010. Regulating Bankers Pay. Georgetown Law Jour-
nal 98(2), 247-287.
[5] Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., Spamann, H., 2010. The wages of failure: Executive compen-
sation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008. Working Paper, Harvard University.
[6] Bebchuk, L., and J. Fried, 2004. Pay without performance: The unfulﬁlled promise
of executive compensation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
[7] Belhaj, M., 2010. Excess capital, operational disaster risk and capital requirements
for banks. Quantitative Finance 11, 653-661.
[8] Biais, B., Mariotti, T., Rochet, J.C., and S. Villeneuve, 2010. Large risk, limited
liability, and dynamic moral hazard. Econometrica 78, 73 - 118.
[9] Bolton, P., Mehran, H., and J. Shapiro, 2010. Executive Compensation and Risk
Taking. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staﬀ Report no. 456.
[10] Bhattacharya, S., Plank, M., Strobl, G., Zechner, J., 2002. Bank capital regulation
with random audits. J. Econ. Dynam. Control 26, 1301-1321.
[11] Bris, A., and S. Cantale, 2004. Bank capital requirements and managerial self-
interest. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 44, 77 - 101.
[12] Chen, C., Steiner, T., and A.M. Whyte, 2006. Does stock option-based executive
compensation induce risk-taking? An analysis of the banking industry. Journal of
Banking and Finance 30, 915-945.
[13] Decamps, J. P., Rochet, J. C. and B. Roger, 2004. The Three Pillars of Basel II:
Optimizing the Mix. Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 132-155.
[14] Decamps, J. P., Mariotti T., Rochet, J. C. and S. Villeneuve, 2011. Free Cash Flow,
Issuance Costs, and Stock Prices. Journal of Finance 66, 1501-1544.
[15] DeMarzo, P. M., Livdan, D., and A. Tchistyi, 2010. Risking Other People's Money:
Gambling, Limited Liability, and Optimal Incentives. Unpublished manuscript.
[16] Koziol, C., and J. Lawrenz (2012). Contingent convertibles. Solving or seeding the
next banking crisis? Journal of Banking and Finance 36, 90 - 104.
27
[17] Laﬀont, J. and D. Martimort (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent
Model. Princeton University Press.
[18] Milne, A. and A. E. Whalley, 2001. Bank Capital Regulation and Incentives for
Risk-Taking. Discussion paper, City University Business School, London, UK.
[19] Perotti, E., Ratnovski, L., and R. Vlahu, 2011. Capital Regulation and Tail Risk.
IMF Working Paper No. 11/188.
[20] Peura, S. and J. Keppo, 2006. Optimal bank capital with costly recapitalisation. The
Journal of Business 79, 2163 - 2201.
[21] Rochet, J.C. and S. Villeneuve, 2011. Liquidity management and corporate demand
for hedging and insurance. Journal of Financial Intermediation 20, 303 - 323.
[22] Sannikov, Y., 2008. A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem.
The Review of Economic Studies 75, 957-984.
[23] Stiglitz, J., 2010. Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World
Economy. New York, W.W. Norton and Company.
[24] Vallascas, F., and J. Hagendorﬀ, 2010. CEO Remuneration and Bank Default Risk:
Evidence from US and Europe. Working paper, University of Bocconi, Careﬁn.
[25] Williams, M., Michael, T., and R. Rao, 2008. Bank mergers, equity risk incentives,
and CEO stock options. Managerial Finance 34, 316-327.
28
